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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE
LONG RUN
Since coming to the St. Louis Fed in March
of 1998, I have repeatedly emphasized in my
speeches that the Federal Reserve is responsible
for the average rate of inflation over the long run.
The Fed has stated its inflation objective as main-
taining a low and stable rate of inflation. The
reason for emphasizing this goal is that the econ-
omy’s long-run economic performance in terms
of employment growth and economic growth is
maximized when the rate of inflation is low and
stable. Moreover, no other economic policy author-
ity can achieve the inflation outcome. Inflation
is fundamentally caused by excessive creation of
money, or liquidity more generally. Controlling
the creation of money is the Fed’s responsibility,
and exercising that power wisely is the main
monetary policy function of the Federal Reserve
System.
Recent years have provided ample evidence
of a proposition that became mainstream in the
economics profession 25 years ago—that it is not
possible to reduce unemployment permanently
by accepting higher inflation. The second half of
the 1990s shows conclusively that the U.S. econ-
omy can enjoy a high rate of economic growth
and declining unemployment without a rising
rate of inflation. Indeed, I am convinced that the
remarkable economic performance of the last half
dozen years or so owes in part to a determined
P
ress commentary on the state of the
U.S. economy has changed dramati-
cally in recent weeks. Economic data
for November and especially
December have come in decidedly weaker than
earlier in the year 2000. Analysts have been
reducing their economic forecasts for 2001, and
some have begun to worry about recession.
Following Federal Reserve policy actions in the
first week of January, many commentators have
been discussing the role of monetary policy in
stabilizing the economic situation.
My purpose today is to provide a perspective
on the role of monetary policy in times such as
these. I’ll talk about what monetary policy can
and cannot do, and what expectations about policy
are reasonable. I’ll begin by discussing monetary
policy in the long run, and by emphasizing the
importance of long-run considerations and how
the strength of the long-run outlook affects the
short-term outlook. I’ll emphasize the basic prin-
ciple that, over the long-run, monetary policy is
responsible for the rate of inflation but has very
little bearing on the average rate of unemployment
or the rate of economic growth. I’ll then talk about
the short run and how short-run policy adjust-
ments fit into the long-run policy stance. Finally,
I will pay special attention to policy leads and
lags. My purpose here is to clarify discussion about
how the economy reacts to policy adjustments
and how those economic responses might lag the
policy adjustments.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at theFederal Reserve policy to keep inflation low and
steady. Participants in markets of all kinds have
developed confidence in that outcome, and that
confidence has been important in unleashing the
inherent vitality and inventiveness of the U.S.
economy to achieve remarkable gains in produc-
tivity and employment.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE
SHORT RUN
If the Fed’s long-run policy is to maintain
low and stable inflation, and if that outcome has
little or no influence on the average rate of unem-
ployment and economic growth, what role is there
for short-run monetary policy?
Policy in the long run is the sum of all the
short-run policy adjustments. Clearly, then, any
short-run policy adjustments for the purpose of
short-run economic stabilization must be pursued
in a manner that is consistent with long-run policy.
For example, if temporary conditions call for
extra monetary stimulus, then that extra stimulus
must be withdrawn in future years so as not to
create higher inflation in the long run. We could
put the argument the other way around as well;
if extra policy restraint is in order some particular
year, that policy restraint must be undone in future
years to remain on the correct long-term course.
Imagine looking at a chart of the unemploy-
ment rate spanning several decades. Let’s assume
that there is a long-term equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate around which the actual unemployment
rate fluctuates. The long–run equilibrium unem-
ployment rate, which I will assume is N percent
of the labor force, may change gradually over
time for a variety of reasons. However, I want to
assume that the unemployment rate N is not
affected by monetary policy, except perhaps that
N can be a little lower when the inflation rate is
low and steady. Incidentally, I choose the letter
N to refer to the long-run equilibrium rate of
unemployment because Milton Friedman called
this rate the “natural rate” of unemployment in
his seminal paper on this subject.
The actual unemployment rate month by
month fluctuates around N percent. The fluctua-
tions around N percent may be quite persistent—
the unemployment rate might remain above or
below N percent for months or even many quarters
at a time.
Economic historians studying monetary policy
in the United States and other countries have
argued—I think convincingly—that central banks
have from time to time made serious mistakes
that increased rather than reduced fluctuations
in the unemployment rate. Certainly, the first
obligation of a central bank is to do no harm. Over
the last 40 years or so, advances in economists’
understanding of macroeconomics and monetary
policy have led to improvements in monetary
policy. The Federal Reserve has been able to avoid
repeating past mistakes and has, I believe, not
added to employment instability since inflation
came down in the early 1980s.
Question: Can monetary policy do more than
simply avoid contributing to employment insta-
bility? That is, can the Fed make a positive con-
tribution to keeping the fluctuations in the
unemployment rate small, thereby keeping the
actual unemployment rate close to N percent? I
think the answer is yes, at least to some degree.
Adjusting monetary policy to limit fluctua-
tions in the unemployment rate is not easy. I do
not count myself in the group of economists
who believe that there is a reliable relationship
between the inflation rate, or the change in the
inflation rate, and the unemployment gap, where
the gap is defined as the actual rate of unemploy-
ment less the estimated value of the natural rate
of unemployment. One very serious problem is
that no one has a reliable estimate of the numerical
value of the natural rate or how it may be chang-
ing. I do not believe that the Federal Reserve
should think of the unemployment rate as a device
to control inflation because I do not believe that
there is a reliable relationship between inflation
and the estimated unemployment gap. Although
all of us want the actual unemployment rate to
settle at as low a level as possible, we must recog-
nize that sometimes—not invariably, but some-
times—actions necessary to control the rate of
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on unemployment. Recognition of that fact is
nothing more than a restatement of the well-
established proposition that the central bank
cannot lower the average rate of unemployment
byacceptingmoreinflation.Weknowfrompainful
experience in the 1970s that an effort to pursue
expansionary monetary policy to hold down
unemployment is doomed to failure if that policy
yields rising inflation.
The way I view monetary policy is that I focus
above all on inflation and then feel my way gin-
gerly on the unemployment front. What I mean
by “feel my way gingerly” is that through exten-
sive experience I have developed a sense of when
business conditions are moving quickly in one
direction or another. A year ago I had the sense
that demand pressures were simply too strong to
be sustained over the indefinite future without
generating substantial risk of higher inflation.
Over the last couple of months, demand pressures,
as measured by a wide variety of indicators amply
commented on in the press, have been substan-
tially less robust. This is not a matter of hard sci-
ence by any means; in forming my sense of current
business conditions, I rely on formal statistics,
business contacts, press reports about the state
of business, and expert staff input. The best
analogy I can offer is that when driving my car I
have a sense of the appropriate speed. That speed
depends upon the nature of the road, my familiar-
ity with it, traffic conditions, weather, the angle
of the sun, the type of car I am driving, and so
forth. At any given time, different skilled drivers
can have a different sense of the safe and reason-
able speed, and both can be correct. When it comes
to monetary policy, those of us directly responsi-
ble for policy decisions sit around the table and
offer our observations and judgments. I know that
the policy discussions at meetings of the Federal
Open Market Committee do help me to become
better informed and do affect my views.
Different views, or views with different
nuances, are perfectly natural given the state of
knowledge. At the same time, it is clear that every-
one in this business will be surprised from time
to time by the actual outcome. I think of this
process as being one of maintaining a firm con-
viction about long-run policy—that is, the critical
importance of achieving low and steady inflation
on the average—and being as nimble as possible
in making short-run adjustments.
My discussion so far has ignored a key part
of this process—the interaction of Fed policy
and market expectations. The Fed’s main policy
instrument is the intended level for the federal
funds rate—the interest rate on overnight bank
loans of reserves on deposit at Federal Reserve
Banks. The Federal Reserve does not have any
direct influence on long-term interest rates such
as that on home mortgages. The federal funds rate
affects the mortgage rate entirely through effects
on market expectations. A 1-week interest rate
reflects expectations about the overnight federal
funds rate for the next week; the 1-month rate
reflects expectations about the next four 1-week
rates; the 1-year rate reflects expectations about
the next 12 one-month rates and a 30-year bond
rate reflects expectations about the next 30 1-year
rates. All of these expectations are formed in the
marketplace. These interest rate expectations
reflect the interplay of market expectations about
future economic developments and future Federal
Reserve policy adjustments, which of course
interact.
The market clearly moves interest rates in
anticipation of future developments. This fact
allows me to be much more precise about what I
mean when I say that the Federal Reserve needs
to be prepared to act nimbly. The Fed does not
have to be, and should not be, hyperactive. Given
that the market understands well how this process
works, the Federal Reserve often can hold a steady
federal funds rate target while waiting for the sit-
uation to clarify. Market interest rates fluctuate
readily up and down as new information arrives.
This point is nicely illustrated by experience
over the last year.
Let me illustrate this process by referring to
the 10-year Treasury bond yield. In January of
last year that rate reached a monthly peak of 6.7
percent. Meanwhile, the Fed was raising the
intended federal funds rate, which reached a
peak of 6.5 percent in May. Over the second half
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demands and the market’s interpretation of the
flow of new information brought the 10-year bond
rate down in irregular fashion. By August, that
rate was down to 5.8 percent and by December it
was down to 5.2 percent. Earlier this month the
FOMC decided to reduce the intended rate from
6.5 to 6.0 percent. However, as can be seen from
the data on the 10-year bond rate I’ve just dis-
cussed, financial conditions eased well before
the FOMC changed policy. Examination of the
Aaa corporate bond rate yields the same conclu-
sion.Usingmonthlyaveragedata,thatratereached
a peak of 8.0 percent in May of last year and by
December was down to 7.2 percent.
The fact that market interest rates moved
ahead of the FOMC does not mean that the Fed
got behind. In fact, in recent years, the market has
typically moved ahead of the Fed. The correct
interpretation, in my view, is that market partici-
pants have great confidence in and understanding
of Federal Reserve policy. Because the markets
understand the Fed, the Fed can afford to hold a
steady setting on the intended federal funds rate
until the evidence becomes clear that a policy
adjustment is appropriate.
Let me now recap this argument, pulling its
various threads together. First, the Federal
Reserve is committed to a long-term policy that
maintains a low and stable rate of inflation.
Second, the Federal Reserve can, in my view,
make short-run policy adjustments as appropriate
to reduce fluctuations in employment and eco-
nomic activity around their long-run trends,
which are determined by non-monetary factors.
The market understands the Fed’s role and can
typically anticipate Fed policy adjustments.
My argument that the Fed can cushion short-
run fluctuations in employment and economic
activity most definitely does not imply that we
can eliminate all such fluctuations. Along with
private business analysts, we are often taken by
surprise by current economic developments. We
are no better than anyone else at forecasting the
unforecastable.
Let me mention one other aspect of this situ-
ation. Let’s suppose that the Federal Reserve were
able to pursue monetary policy by some mecha-
nism other than by setting the intended level of
the federal funds rate. That is, suppose all inter-
est rates, including the federal funds rate, were
free to fluctuate freely in the market. Assume also
that the Fed were successful in maintaining low
and stable inflation on average and in offsetting
some part of short-run economic disturbances,
though not all. Then, we would observe interest
rates fluctuating up and down as pressures in
the financial markets rose and fell. These interest
ratefluctuationswouldnotbeadirectconsequence
of Federal Reserve policy but of the workings of
the market economy. Although the Fed in fact
sets the intended rate on federal funds, one way
of looking at what the Fed does is that it tries
more or less to replicate the interest rate fluctua-
tions that would occur in the policy model just
described. That is, interest rates would need to
fluctuate in response to the ebbs and flows of
credit market conditions as necessary to maintain
the economy’s equilibrium close to full employ-
ment and with an ongoing inflation rate that is
low and steady. Although the Fed in fact sets the
intended federal funds rate, it has relatively lit-
tle freedom year-by-year as to what level to set if
it wants to be successful in achieving its policy
objectives.
POLICY LEADS AND LAGS
I’ve emphasized the broad outlines of how
policy works and now want to say just a few words
about a topic much in the news recently. Many
observers have expressed concern over weakness
in some of the economic statistics. At the same
time, they often remark that a Federal Reserve
policy response is unlikely to have much effect
for six to nine months or perhaps longer. The
argument is, implicitly, that the Fed is powerless
to do much to stem economic weakness in the
near term.
The conclusion is in one respect correct but
the reason has nothing to do with the asserted
policy lags. I’ve already emphasized that interest
rates fell substantially over the second half of
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many months. The market could not predict the
timing of the recent Fed policy easing, but it did
predict the fact of easing at some point. If interest
rates decline in anticipation of Fed actions, then
thepolicylagshouldbemeasuredfromthedecline
in market interest rates and not from the date of
Fed action anticipated by market interest rates.
In May of last year, at the time the Fed last tight-
ened policy, the 10-year bond rate was 6.4 percent.
Using monthly average data, the 10-year bond
rate fell every month thereafter. Some of the same
observers contending that the economy’s response
will lag Fed action note that housing has held up
pretty well in recent months. Surely the reason
in part is that mortgage rates have been coming
down, along with other rates. Last year, the 30-
year conventional mortgage rate fell from 8.5
percent in May to 7.4 percent in December.
These observations make clear that the ques-
tion of the length of the lag from the Fed’s policy
action earlier this month is not well defined,
because the market gradually eased rates last
year in anticipation of eventual Fed action. The
markets and the Fed have a common interest in
understanding how the economy is evolving.
Whether the Fed can ensure that the economy
will not fall into a recession this year is really an
issue of whether the markets and the Fed together
can anticipate, and offset, developments that
could lead to a recession. There is no guarantee
as to the outcome.
My personal economic forecast is completely
consistent with the mainstream of private fore-
casters, for I know that I have no comparative
advantage in producing a superior forecast.
Neither the Federal Reserve nor private business
firms can foresee future developments with great
accuracy. What we can do is to respond sensibly
to current developments, making sure that we
keep in mind the long-term policy goals and not
overreact to short-run disturbances on which we
can have little effect.
My bottom line on the outlook for the U.S.
economy this year matches that of private fore-
casters. The best guess of private forecasters at
this time is that the economy will continue to
grow, but more slowly than last year. There is a
range of possible outcomes around that best guess;
that range does include a recession outcome,
although private economic forecasters do not
view that outcome as highly likely at this time.
The economy also has the potential to perform
better than the best guess.
Your reaction to my fearless forecast may be,
“so, what else is new?” The answer is that the
situation today is not unusual, except for those
with memories that go back only five years or so.
If we consider again the title of my talk today,
“Monetary Policy in Uncertain Times,” my mes-
sage is that these times seem much more uncer-
tain than they really are. Yes, a recession is in the
realm of possibility, but it is not a best guess at
this time. Nothing has happened to change the
appropriate assessment of the economy’s long-run
potential. The fact that excessively optimistic
long-run growth forecasts—“excessively exuber-
ant” is the phrase I’m searching for but dare not
use!—have disappeared speaks to those forecast-
ers and not to the economy’s growth potential.
Growth prospects remain excellent. The inflation
outlook for the next couple of years and long-term
inflation expectations remain low.
In sum, the near-term outlook has changed—
butitisalwayschanginginsomerespectorother—
and the long-run fundamentals are sound.
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